ABSTRACT A telecare medicine information system (TMIS) for health-care delivery service requires information exchange among multiple IT systems, where different types of users with different access privileges are involved. In TMIS, users generally communicate via public channels. Hence, authentication is essential to provide access to the genuine users. However, access rights for the correct information and resources for different services to the genuine users can be provided with the help of efficient user access control mechanism. The existing user authentication protocols designed for TMIS only provide authentication, but for this kind of application, it is required that the authorized users should also have unique access privilege to access specific data. This paper puts forwards a new fine grained access control with user authentication scheme for TMIS. We present the formal security analysis using both the widely accepted real-or-random model and Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. The proposed scheme supports user anonymity, forward secrecy, and efficient password change without contacting the remote server. In addition, the proposed scheme is comparable with respect to communication and computation costs as compared with other related schemes proposed in TMIS. Moreover, better tradeoff among security and functionality features, and communication and computation costs makes the proposed scheme suitable and practical for telecare medicine environments as compared with other existing related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies are increasingly used in telemedical and healthcare sector to improve medical services with reduced costs. Telecare medicine information system (TMIS) allows delivering personal health assistance to the patient's homes as patients can access healthcare related information on their electronic devices. Also, use of TMIS makes it possible to set up a connection between patients at home and doctors at a clinical center or home healthcare agency.
TMIS involves interconnected healthcare facilities and automated patient electronic medical records (EMRs) that are transmitted between patients and the telecare server. Therefore, a secure communication among connected patients, doctors and the telecare server is an essential requirement. Several authentication schemes are proposed for TMIS to provide security on the issues like authentication, privacy protection and data confidentiality. Unfortunately, none of these schemes discuss on the need of centralized or distributed data access control strategies of the user to access the medical server data.
The basic objectives of a practical telemedical and healthcare system cannot be fulfilled without a proper access control of the user sensitive records stored in the medical server.
The server data may belong to different security levels and is meant to be accessed only by the selected types of users. The problem of assigning unique access privilege to a particular user is called fine-grained access control. Fine-grained data access control can identify and impose different access privileges for different types of users. For example, a medical officer or senior doctor should be able to access all types of medical records and diagnostic information of a patient for the purpose of overall treatment, whereas a nurse might only need to check the current sugar level or blood pressure of a patient.
In a hierarchical access control, a user of higher security level class has the ability to access information items (such as message, data, files, etc.) of other users of lower security classes. Several key management techniques in the user hierarchical access control have been proposed in the literature. Achieving fine-grained data access control with an efficient authentication mechanism is an important research area in TMIS. Before allowing access to the sensitive and private data of the patients, an external user (doctor) must be authenticated for a particular access privilege by the medical server.
To address this challenge, we propose a new fine-grained access control using smart card and biometric based user authentication scheme, specially tailored for TMIS. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one to realize distributed fine-grained data access control with authentication for TMIS.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a new fine-grained user access control scheme based on attributes. We also use user biometrics and password for authentication purpose. To increase the overall performance, we divide all users into several groups based on the access type, and also introduce key policy attribute based encryption to provide access control with full granularity.
In summary, the following contributions are listed below:
• We introduce the concept of fine-grained data access control of server data with suitable authentication scheme in TMIS.
• The proposed scheme provides password and groupbased user authentication depending on the access rights provided for the genuine users in TMIS.
• The proposed scheme provides user anonymity during any message communication that protects patient's privacy. Also, a user never delivers his/her original identity to the the medical server. Hence, the original identity of the user can not be disclosed to an attacker even if the server spoofing attack is executed.
• The proposed scheme provides better security as compared with the other relevant authentication schemes because it resists denial-of-service (DoS), privileged-insider, stolen smart card, replay, man-in-themiddle, password guessing, impersonation and reflection attacks.
• The proposed scheme establishes a secret session key between the user and the medical server so that the established key can be used for future secure communication of the real-time data between them in the telecare system.
• Finally, the proposed scheme provides efficient and flexible way to change a legal user's password locally, which does not require any involvement of the medical server.
B. MOTIVATION
In TMIS, different types of users send different types of data requests to the medical server. The users of this system are of heterogeneous types in nature that include patients, doctors, health staffs, insurance persons, medical researchers, etc. The access privilege of the user, domain and range of data accessibility and the privacy levels of the users are different with respect to a healthcare system. The users having similar features and similar data requirements can constitute a user group with an assigned group identity. Further, based on the user requirements and security levels, information stored in medical server can be classified into several information types, where each type contains a set of data attributes. Hence, having a prior knowledge of intended information type and group identity, a user can achieve attribute-based access control over server data. This allows a user to achieve fine-grained server data access control with full granularity. Till date, several protocols have been developed in TMIS that provide proper user authentication. But none of them delivers a mechanism to provide user authentication with proper access privilege through fine-grained access control in TMIS. This motivates us to develop a fine-grained access control with full granularity with the help of user authentication scheme in TMIS.
C. ADVERSARY MODEL
We apply the Dolev-Yao threat model (DY model) [1] . According to DY model, any two communicating parties communicate over an insecure channel. An attacker has the ability to eavesdrop the transmitted messages over the public insecure channel. In addition, he/she has the ability to alter, modify or delete the contents of the transmitted messages. Furthermore, if the smart card or mobile device of a user is lost or stolen, an attacker will be able to extract all the sensitive information stored in its memory by the power analysis attack on the smart card or the mobile device [2] , [3] .
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review the existing authentication schemes in TMIS. Also, we review the relevant attribute based and group based access control schemes in this section. The related mathematical preliminaries are provided in Section III. In Section IV, we propose a new fine-grained data access control scheme with authentication for TMIS. In Section V, through a detailed security analysis, we analyze how our VOLUME 5, 2017 scheme is resistant to different types of possible well-known attacks. Security, functionality analysis and performance comparison of our scheme with related existing schemes are given in Section VI and Section VII. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Over last few years, researchers have developed numerous password based authentication schemes using smart card in the field of TMIS [4] - [6] . Along with this, to ensure security and authorized communication, some biometrics or chaotic map based schemes are also developed that provide user anonymity, uniqueness and privacy. Biometric based remote user authentication schemes are introduced in TMIS to provide enhanced security [7] . These schemes can resist stolen smart card attack, off-line password guessing, impersonation attack, etc. User anonymity preserving scheme with dynamic ID based authentication was proposed for TMIS by Chen et al. [8] . A series of enhanced anonymity preserving authentication schemes have been proposed in order to provide better security to the system and to withstand security drawbacks of the earlier schemes [5] , [9] , [10] .
Chaotic map and chaotic hash function based user authentication scheme with key agreement scheme using smart card was proposed by Guo and Chang in TMIS environment [11] . To enhance its security, functionality and performance on the computation and efficiency, several chaotic map based user authentication schemes with smart card have been proposed [10] - [13] .
Session key agreement with mutual authentication between a user and the medical server is essential for future secret communication of data in a telecare system. Very recently, researchers have developed authentication schemes with secret shared session key security [11] , [12] , [14] , [15] .
Fine-grained access control systems assign unique access privilege to a particular user and allow flexibility in specifying the access rights of individual users. Though several techniques are known for implementing fine-grained access control in different fields, little attention has been received so far to implement it in the field of medical telecare and health sector with proper authentication.
Shamir [16] and Blackley [17] introduced a tree access structure based cryptographic technique known as secretsharing schemes (SSS). Sahai and Waters proposed Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption (FIBE) [18] that introduced another cryptographic primitive, called attribute based encryption (ABE). The root idea of FIBE comes from the seminal work of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) proposed by Shamir [19] , and it is also based on several primitive works of IBE [20] , [21] .
A much enriched form of ABE, called Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) was developed by Goyal et al. [22] to achieve fine-grained access control of encrypted data. Their scheme uses the concept of bilinear pairing based cryptographic primitives. Yu et al. proposed a scheme to implement the idea of KP-ABE into the field of wireless sensor network (WSN) [23] . Yu et al.'s scheme exploits the fundamental cryptographic concepts of KP-ABE technique [22] . Chatterjee and Roy then proposed fine-grained user access control scheme with attribute based encryption using elliptic curve cryptography for hierarchical WSN [24] . KP-ABE techniques are also used in various applications like cloud security [1] , [25] , enterprise class applications [25] and WSN security [23] - [25] .
Chatterjee and Das [26] proposed a novel ECC-based user access control scheme with attribute-based encryption. Recently, Chatterjee et al. also designed two fine grained access control schemes for secure data access in cloud networks [27] and enterprise class applications [28] . In addition, Odelu et al. proposed a privacy-preserving three-party authentication suitable for battery-limited mobile devices [29] . Generally speaking, these schemes aim to achieve fine grained data access control over user data, but they do not provide proper user authentication as well, which is extremely required for TMIS based applications.
III. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
We apply one-way cryptographic hash function, Chebyshev polynomial and chaotic maps, and fuzzy extractor for the proposed authentication scheme and also for analyzing other existing schemes in TMIS. For this purpose, we describe the fundamental concepts on one-way hash function [30] , fuzzy extractor on biometrics input, Chebyshev polynomial and chaotic maps [31] , [32] .
A. COLLISION-RESISTANT ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION
A one-way cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n takes a binary string q ∈ {0, 1} * of any arbitrary length as an input and produces a binary string H (q) ∈ {0, 1} n as an output. The collision-resistant property of H (·) is given as follows [33] .
Definition 1: The advantage probability of an adversary A in finding collision with the execution time t is defined as Adv HASH 
B. CHEBYSHEV POLYNOMIAL AND ITS PROPERTIES
The Chebyshev polynomial T n (x) :
The recurrence relation of Chebyshev polynomial is as follows
7014 VOLUME 5, 2017 One can refer to [31] and [32] for the semi-group property of the enhanced Chebyshev polynomial and Chaotic mapbased discrete logarithm problem (CMDLP). The CMDLP is stated as follows. For any given x and y, it is computationally infeasible to find an integer s such that T s (x) = y.
Bergamo et al. [34] described an attack that allows one to compute an integer solution s from the equation
arccos (x) , k ∈ Z, where Z is the set of all integers.
C. BIOMETRICS AND FUZZY EXTRACTOR
Biometric keys, such as iris, fingerprint and palmprint, are now increasingly used in several authentication protocols due to their uniqueness property [35] - [38] . The major advantages of using the biometric keys are (i) they are extremely hard to forge or distribute, (ii) they are extremely difficult to copy or share, and (iii) they can not be lost or forgotten as they can not be guessed easily [39] , [40] .
Recently, the fuzzy extractor method has been used effectively in extracting biometric key from a given user biometric input [4] , [41] . The fuzzy extractor takes a biometric feature input, say B from user and exploits a probabilistic generation function in a permissible error tolerant manner to generate the unique random string, say α and the auxiliary string, say β. Further, using a deterministic reproduction procedure, it generates the same original string α, with auxiliary string β and a noisy user biometric B that differs from the original biometric B up to a threshold value [29] , [42] .
The fuzzy extractor is defined by five tuples (M, λ, τ, m, δ) along with two algorithms Gen(·) and Rep(·).
• M = {0, 1} v represents a metric space of biometric data points with finite dimension. The distance function : M × M → Z + calculates the similarity between two different biometric inputs B 1 and B 2 .
• λ is the length (in bits) of unique string α.
• τ is the permissible error tolerance.
• m is the min-entropy of a probability distribution W on metric space M.
• δ is the allowable maximum statistical distance between two probability distributions α 1 , β and α 2 , β . The functions Gen(·) and Rep(·) are defined as follows:
• Gen: It is defined as α, β ← Gen(B), where α ∈ {0, 1} λ and B ∈ M such that statistical distance between the probability distributions α, β and α 1 , β , SD( α, β , α 1 , β ) ≤ δ. Here, α 1 refers a uniform binary string of length λ, where λ = m − 2 log(
, [41] .
• Rep: It is defined as follows: ∀B ∈ M, ∀B ∈ M and (B, B ) ≤ τ such that if α, β ← Gen(B), then Rep(B , β) = α. Suppose I is a string of 2 k elements, with k < n. Further, assume that (i) I e : M → I is an encoding function (one-toone), and (ii) I d : {0, 1} n → I is a decoding function (error tolerant up to τ bits). Then Gen(B) outputs α = H (B) and public parameter β = B ⊕ I e (α). Taking noisy biometric B and public parameter β, Rep(B , β) generates
D. BILINEAR PAIRING AND BILINEAR MAP
The fundamentals of bilinear map are described briefly [22] . Bilinear Map: Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g 1 and g 2 be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map is an injective function e : G 1 × G 2 → G T with the following three properties:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for each u ∈ G 1 and v ∈ G 2 .
IV. THE PROPOSED FINE GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
In this section, we first tabulate the important notations that are useful to explain and analyze our scheme. We then explain in detail the various phases related to our scheme.
A. NOTATIONS
We use the notations listed in Table 1 to describe and analyze the proposed scheme. We use the secure hash standard (SHA-1) [43] as one-way cryptographic hash function. For symmetric key encryption/decryption, we apply the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128) [44] in our proposed scheme. Note that for better security, one can also consider SHA-256 as one-way cryptographic hash function [43] .
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHEME
In this section, we describe how our proposed fine grained user access control scheme works using attribute based access control. The proposed scheme consists of five phases: 1) setup, 2) registration, 3) login, 4) authorization, and 5) password change. These phases are discussed in detail in VOLUME 5, 2017 the following subsections. We make use of the current timestamps in order to prevent the replay attack. For this reason, we assume that all the entities in TMIS are synchronized with their clocks.
1) SETUP PHASE
This phase is used to pre-load keying materials to the medical application server and user smart card prior to start working. The server MAS chooses a set of network parameters using the following steps:
• Step 1: MAS chooses two multiplicative cyclic groups G 1 and G T of prime order p as well as a bilinear map e:
Let g be the generator of G 1 .
• Step 2: MAS chooses a number t a uniformly at random from Z p for each attribute a ∈ I, and selects a random number y ∈ Z p , where
• Step 3: MAS establishes a universe of all information types IT . It further creates n smaller disjoints sets of information types
Each user U j of the healthcare system requests server information through its assigned group identity GID j . U j , using its own group identity GID j , can access information from one or more suitable information types IT i , where IT i ⊂ IT . Further, an information type IT i might belong to more than one user group identities. Every information type IT i contains a number of relevant server attributes that provides the necessary server information to a user U j .
• Step 4: Finally, MAS assigns a unique randomly generated master key, say MK S for its own. In addition, MAS selects a one-way cryptographic hash function H (·) (for example, SHA-1 [43] ).
2) REGISTRATION PHASE
In the registration phase, a user U j needs to register with the MAS for accessing medical data. This phase consists of the following steps:
• Step 1: U j first chooses his/her identity ID U j and password PW j , and then imprints personal biometrics B j on the sensor of a specific device.
• Step 2: U j selects a 160-bit random number r j ∈ Z p . U j generates (α j , β j ) = Gen(B j ), where Gen(·) is a fuzzy extractor generation procedure. U j further computes the masked password W j = H (α j ||PW j ) and calculates A ID j = H (α j ||ID U j ||r j ). Next, it chooses its access group id GID j and then sends the registration request message A ID j , W j , α j , GID j to MAS via a secure channel.
• Step 3: MAS selects a unique server id S ID , and keeps the information A ID j and GID j . Further, for each user U j , it generates A j = H (A ID j ||TS U j ), where TS U j denotes the registration time stamp of U j . It then calculates the secret parameter R U j = H (W j ||A j ||GID j ) for each user U j .
• Step 4: Finally, the MAS computes the secret shared parameter with U j as
for U j . This phase has two sub-phases, namely access structure generation and smart card generation, which are discussed below.
a: ACCESS STRUCTURE GENERATION
The MAS selects an access structure P j for each user U j . After getting the registration information from valid users, the MAS assigns each user an access structure. The access structures are implemented via an access tree. Every leaf node of the access tree is labeled with an attribute and the internal nodes are threshold gates. Access structures are represented using the logic expressions over the attributes. With the help of the access tree, the data access privileges of each user can be defined. For example, consider a scenario as explained in [24] . The medical server can store information on many ''in-body'' diseases like cardiovascular problem, neurological disorder, etc. (in-body attribute). Suppose the MAS can measure some ''on-body'' parameters like body temperature, pulse rate, etc (on-body attribute). The medical records have multiple relevant users like doctor, nurse, hospital staffs, etc. Hence, a medical record stored in the server can be specified with these attributes [inbody = {cardiovascular disease, neurological disorder, cancer}, on-body = {pulse rate, body temperature} and owner = {doctor, nurse, hospital stsff}]. The medical application server provides each user an access policy via a user access tree. A user can decrypt data through its access tree only if it has matching attributes with the data sent by the medical server. A user U j with the access structure is provided in Figure 1 , who can decrypt the server data stored within a medical server that detects in-body disease likes cardiovascular disease or neurological disorder, and contains on-body measuring attributes as pulse rate or body temperature, and at least owned by 2 out-of 4 experts like doctor, nurse, hospital staff or medical insurance person.
For each user U j , the server generates an access structure P j and computes the secret key SK j . Starting from the root node r of P j and in the top-down manner, MAS also constructs a random polynomial q x of degree d x − 1 using the Lagrange interpolation [45] for each node x ∈ P j , where d x is the degree of a node x. For each non-root node x ∈ P j , it sets q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)), where parent(x) is the parent of x, and x is the index(x) th child of its parent. In particular, we have q r (0) = y. The user secret key SK j is the output, which is derived as follows:
where L denotes the set of leaf nodes and g is the generator of G 1 .
b: SMART CARD GENERATION
The MAS generates a smart card with valid identity SC id j for user U j with the following parameters:
The MAS then deletes the user's secret parameter R U j from records as soon as the registration procedure of U j is over. However, it keeps A j and GID j for each user U j . Finally, U j stores β j , Gen(·), Rep(·) and τ into the smart card SC j , where τ is the permissible error tolerance value used in Rep(·) function.
This registration phase is summarized in Figure 2 .
3) LOGIN PHASE
The purpose of this phase is to login to the system by a legal user U j , who wants to access any specific data from the MAS. This login phase is further summarized in Figure 2 . U j performs the following steps:
• Step 1: U j first inserts his/her smart card SC j into the card reader of a specific terminal and imprints his/her personal biometrics B j . U j also inputs his/her password PW j and identity ID j .
• Step 2: Using the fuzzy extractor reproduction procedure Rep(·) and stored β j , SC j computes α j = Rep(B j , β j ), • Step 3: U j selects the suitable information type IT i for which he/she wants to access the server information.
. U j selects a random secret value n j and computes
where T U j is the current time stamp of U j .
• Step 4:
4) AUTHORIZATION PHASE
In this phase, a mutual authentication between a user U j and the server MAS takes place. At the end of this phase, both U j and MAS establish a session key for their future secure communication. This phase is summarized in Figure 3 . This phase involves the following steps:
• Step 1: After receiving of the user request message in the login phase, the MAS first checks the validity of the received timestamp T U j by the condition
is the time when the message is received by the MAS and T is the maximum transmission delay. If the condition does not hold, it means that it is a replay message and the phase is terminated immediately by the MAS.
, and then checks the condition N j = N j . If this verification does not hold, the authentication request fails and the phase terminates.
• Step 3: The MAS further checks whether IT i ∈ IT and IT i ∈ GID j . If both conditions satisfy, the user group is authorized to access the requested information type. The MAS then selects an access session key K s for accessing the data under information type IT i such that U j will only get the session key if he/she has proper access privilege.
•
Step 4: The MAS selects a random number α ∈ Z p and calculates
Following the strategy of the challenge-response protocol, the MAS can create a puzzle message PM and computes an encrypted puzzle using its computed key K s as E K s (PM ). Also, it generates a hash value H (A j ||PM ||E || T s || T U j ), where T s is the current timestamp of the MAS. The MAS also computes
where RN s is a random nonce generated by the MAS. Note that
, E j to to the user U j via a public channel.
• Step 5: After receiving the message from the MAS in
Step 4, U j first checks if |T s − T * s | < T for checking the validity of the received timestamp T s , where T * s is the time when the message
and verifies it against the received value K j . If this verification holds, it then proceeds for the next step; otherwise the phase is terminated immediately.
• Step 6: For accessing the attributes under information type IT i , U j decrypts the encrypted key K s and retrives the puzzle message PM . For this purpose, U j uses a recursive algorithm as follows. The decryption process starts from the leaf nodes of its own access tree P j and continues in the bottom-up manner. U j computes F i for each leaf node x in P usng the following logic:
If the access structure P j ''accepts'' I i , it means all the attributes specified for the information type IT i are matched with the user access structure and U j will finally obtain e(g, g)
. Thus, U j is able to decrypt the puzzle message PM using K s . Otherwise, the decryption algorithm returns ⊥ (null).
• in its memory. This phase is also summarized in Figure 4 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, through the formal and informal security analysis, we show that our scheme can resist various known attacks, which are given in the following subsections.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING REAL-OR-RANDOM MODEL
We present the formal security analysis of the proposed fine-grained access control scheme through the widely-used VOLUME 5, 2017 Real-Or-Random model [46] . Random oracles are considered under a formal security model. An adversary A can make several oracle queries, which model the adversary's capabilities in a real attack. To proof the formal security of our scheme, we consider all possible oracle queries.
We simulate various security attacks on the proposed scheme, say P through the following oracle queries:
• Send(U j /MAS, m): Through this query A sends a request message m to P t , and P t replies to A according to the rules of the protocol.
• Execute(U j , MAS): This query enables A with a capability to eavesdrop message m communicated between U j and MAS in an actual execution of the protocol.
• Corrupt(U j , a): Depending on respective value of a, this query returns user password, biometric string or smart card parameters to the adversary A.
• Reveal(P t ): The current session key SK generated by P t (and its partner) is revealed to A through this query.
• Test(P t ): Through this query A can send a request to P t for the current session key SK and receive a null value, if no session key is generated. Otherwise, P t can take decision according to the outcome of an unbiased flipped coin b. Basically, this query is used to measure the strength of the semantic security of the session key SK . Proof: We follow the formal security proof of this theorem as provided in [32] . We define a set of games G i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) starting from the game G 0 and terminating at the game G 5 . Let Succ i be an event defined as successful guessing of the bit b in Test query corresponding to each game G i by the adversary A.
Game G 0 : This game and the real protocol in random oracles are assumed to be identical. Hence, we have,
(1)
Game G 1 : All oracle queries (except Send query) are simulated in the game G 1 . Working procedures of Send, Reveal, Execute, Corrupt, Test and hash queries are shown in Table 2 . Send query is simulated in Table 3 . We create three lists that record the outputs of different oracle queries: 1) list L H answers hash oracle H queries, 2) list L A stores outputs of random oracle queries, and 3) list L T records transcripts between U j and MAS. Due to the indistinguishability of simulation of G 1 and the real protocol execution of G 0 , we obtain
Game G 2 : This game considers the collision situations with hash results and random numbers in the transcripts of all communicated messages in the login and authentication phases of our scheme. Following the birthday paradox, the collision probability of H hash oracle query is at most numbers RN s and RN j , respectively, the probability of random numbers collision is at most (q s +q e ) 2 2 lr +1 . So, we have,
Game G 3 : This game considers a situation where A obtains the correct message transcript luckily without active participation of hash oracles H . As the login and authorization phases of our scheme involve three messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 communications, we consider following three cases in G 3 :
Case 1: In this case, we consider Send(MAS, Msg 1 ) query and try to respond it. Hence, the hash value 
Game G 4 : This game considers all online and offline attacks executed by the adversary A. As our scheme provides three-factor authentication security, we need to consider guessing of both password and biometrics.
Case 1: To start the queries along with password PW j and biometrics B j , A requires all information stored in smart card of U j . For this purpose, A executes Corrupt(U j , 3), which is composed of the following two sub-cases: Case 1.1: For online password guessing, A runs query Corrupt(U j , 1). Here, A selects a password on-the-fly from dictionary D and then runs at most q s times Send(MAS,Msg 1 ) query. The probability of this case is q s |D| . Case 1.2: It deals with passing of biometrics checking by A through query Corrupt(U j , 2). For each guessing, the probability is at most 1 
l b
, where l b is the length of extracted secret biometric string. Moreover, we should consider the possible accidental guessing of ''false positive" case with probability ε bm . In general, it is observed that for fingerprints, ε bm ≈ 2 −14 [47] . As a whole, the guessing probability under this case is at most max{q s (
It is obvious that the simulation of the games G 3 and G 4 are not distinguishable without execution of the above mentioned guessing attacks. So, we have,
Considering all above games, since A gains no advantage to guess the correct bit b, we get,
Using the triangular inequality, we have,
Using Equations (1)- (6), we obtain,
Finally, multiplying both sides by 2 in Equation (7) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the required result. Hence, the theorem is proved.
B. AUTHENTICATION PROOF BASED ON BAN-LOGIC
The BAN logic is used in analyzing the security of authentication schemes [19] , [48] in order to prove secure mutual authentication between communicating parties in a network.
In this section, we provide authentication proof using the BAN logic and then demonstrate how the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between a user U j and the medical server MAS. The notations used in BAN logic analysis are defined as follows.
• P |≡ X : Principal P believes statement X .
• P X : P sees the statement X .
• #(X ) : The formula X is fresh.
• P | X : Principal P once said statement X .
• (X , Y ): Formula X or formula Y is one part of the formula (X , Y ).
• P ⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over statement X .
• X Y : This represents X combined with the formula Y .
• P K ←→ Q : P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate. K is good in that it will be known only by P and Q.
• P X Q : Formula X is a secret known only to P and to Q, and possibly to principals trusted by them. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities to one another.
• SK : Session key used in the current session. The rules given below describe the main logical postulates of the BAN logic [48] , [49] :
• Rule 1. (Message-meaning)
• Rule 2. (Nonce-verification) P |≡ #(X ), P |≡ Q | X P |≡ Q |≡ X .
• Rule 3. (Freshness-conjuncatenation)
• Rule 4. (Jurisdiction) P |≡ Q ⇒ X , P |≡ Q |≡ X P |≡ X .
• Rule 5. (Other inference)
According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the proposed protocol will satisfy the following goals:
• Goal 2. S |≡ (U j SK
←→ MAS).
The generic types of our proposed protocol are given below:
). The idealized form of the proposed protocol are given below.
Regarding the initial state of the scheme, we make the following basic assumptions to further analyze the proposed scheme.
• A.1:
Based on the above-mentioned assumptions and the logical postulates of the BAN logic, we analyze the idealized form of the proposed scheme, and provide the main procedures of proof as follows.
The MAS receives one login message (Msg 1 ) and one authentication message (Msg 3 ) from U j . Both these messages contribute to achieve Goal 2. According to the Msg 1 , we obtain the following:
• S 2 : According to the inference rule (Rule 5), we obtain MAS R j , T U j , IT i S j .
• S 3 : According to A.8 and Rule 1, we obtain MAS |≡ U j | (R j , T U j , IT i ).
• S 4 : According to A.2(a) and Rule 3, we obtain MAS |≡ #(R j , T U j , IT i ).
• S 5 : According to S 3 , S 4 and Rule 2, we obtain MAS |≡ U j |≡ (R j , T U j , IT i ).
• S 6 : According to A.4 and Rule 4, we obtain MAS |≡ (R j , T U j , IT i ).
• S 7 : According to S 6 and Rule 5, we obtain S j |≡ T U j .
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According to Msg 3 , we obtain the following: • S 11 : According to A.2(b) and Rule 3, we obtain MAS |≡ #(PM , RN j , T i ).
• S 12 : According to S 10 , S 11 and Rule 2, we obtain MAS |≡ U j |≡ (PM , RN j , T i ).
• S 13 : According to A.4 and Rule 4, we obtain MAS |≡ (PM , RN j , T i ).
• S 14 : According to S 13 and Rule 5, we obtain MAS |≡ RN j .
• 
←→ MAS).
(Goal 2) According to Msg 2 , we obtain the following:
• S 18 : According to Rule 5, we obtain
• S 19 : According to A.7 and Rule 1, we obtain
• S 20 : According to A.1 and Rule 3, we obtain U j |≡ #(RN s , PM , E , T s , T U j ).
• S 21 : According to S 19 , S 20 and Rule 2, we obtain U j |≡ MAS |≡ (RN s , PM , E , T s , T U j ).
• S 22 : According to A.3 and Rule 4, we obtain U j |≡ (RN s , PM , E , T s , T U j ).
• S 23 : According to S 22 and Rule 5, we obtain U j |≡ RN s , U j |≡ PM and U j |≡ T s .
• S 24 : According to A.5 and Rule 5, we get U j |≡ RN j , U j |≡ A j , U j |≡ T U j and U j |≡ K s .
• S 25 : According to the proposed scheme,
Finally, according to S 23 and S 24 , we obtain U j |≡
(Goal 1) From the Goals 1 and 2, it is clear that the secure mutual authentication between U j and MAS is achieved.
C. DISCUSSION ON OTHER ATTACKS
In this section, through the informal security analysis we show that our scheme is also secure against the following known attacks.
1) STOLEN SMART CARD ATTACK
Suppose the user U j 's smart card SC j with id SC id j is lost or stolen. By monitoring the power consumption [2] , [3] , an attacker A can extract all the stored information from SC j , Rep(·) and τ . It is to be noted that the user identity ID U j , password PW j and biometric B j are not directly stored in SC j . To retrieve them, A need to know ID U j , PW j and B j from stored (A ID j ⊕ SC id j ) and R U j . From A ID j = H (α j || ID U j ||r j ), A has no feasible way to know the user's id ID U j or biometric B j . Due to one-way property of the hash function H (·), it is considered to be a computationally infeasible problem. In addition, user id ID U j , biometric B j and password PW j can not be retrieved from
due to the one-way property of H (·). Moreover, A has no feasible way to obtain user id, password or biometric even if the brute force search is applied, because he/she has to guess ID U j , B j and PW j simultaneously. As a result, our scheme prevents stolen smart card attack or smart card breach attack.
2) REPLAY ATTACK
Replay attack is considered to be one of the most common attacks in any security protocol. Suppose in the login phase, an attacker A intercepts and replays the transmitted message
The MAS discards the message if
is the timestamp when the MAS receives this message and T is the maximum transmission delay. In the authorization phase, the MAS sends the message
and RN s is a server generated random nonce selected for each session. Use of the server timestamp T s , if this message is replayed by A to the MAS, the timestamp validation of T s will fail, and the message will be discarded by the MAS too. Thus, the proposed scheme protects the replay attack.
3) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
Using the privileged insider attack, a genuine privileged user, say U m of the MAS may turn out to be a malicious user, and also may try to achieve password of other legal user U j . However, according to our scheme, U j does not submit the original password PW j in the MAS. Rather, he/she stores A ID j , W j , where A ID j = H (α j ||ID U j ||r j ) and W j = H (α j ||PW j ). Any privileged insider U m can not obtain user's id ID U j , password PW j or biometric B j from A ID j or W j as it is computationally infeasible due to one-way property of H (·). Therefore, a malicious insider U m cannot obtain the user secret credentials, and the proposed scheme has the ability to defend the privileged insider attack.
4) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Through the man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary A may try to modify the intercepted login or authorization messages. Suppose an adversary A intercepts the login and authorization messages
||RN j , and tries to modify these messages.
To modify the message Msg 1 , A needs to modify the parameters IT i , T U j , (TS U j ⊕ H (n j ||GID j )). Use of the server timestamp T s , random nonce RN s and the hash value H (RN s || PM || E || T s || T U j ) prevents any possibility of modification of any parameter in the message Msg 2 . In a similar way, to modify the message Msg 3 , A needs PM and K s . Due to the oneway property of H (·) and symmetric encryption/decryption, it is quite difficult task for A to modify the messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 to convert to legal valid messages. Hence, the proposed scheme is free from the man-in-the-middle attack.
5) OFFLINE AND ONLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
Executing the power analysis attacks [2] , [3] , an attacker A can extract all the stored information from a lost or stolen smart card SC j of U j . To obtain the user identity ID U j , password PW j and biometric key α j , A has to guess α j and ID U j simultaneously from A ID j = H (α j ||ID U j ||r j ). Similarly, to obtain the password PW j , the attacker need to guess PW j , α j and ID U j simultaneously from
Due to the oneway property of H (·), correct guessing of password from the parameter R U j is a computationally infeasible problem. So, our scheme can resist offline password guessing attack. Furthermore, by eavesdropping or intercepting the messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 , A cannot guess or obtain the password PW j , biometric key α j or identity ID U j of the user U j . Thus, the proposed scheme can also resist online password guessing attack.
6) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Using the user impersonation attack, an adversary or a malicious user A can try to masquerade as a legitimate user and try to login to the server MAS. However, our proposed scheme can resist this attack due to the following arguments:
• A needs to input a correct value of password PW j , biometric B j or identity ID U j to prove its authenticity to the smart card system as a genuine user. However, we have analyzed that A has no feasible way to guess these parameters.
• A can try to generate a replay login message
) and submit it to the MAS. However, a duplicate value of the random nonce n j and validity of timestamp will reveal that the message is a replayed one and not an original message. To modify the parameters in Msg 1 , A needs to change the value of N j , where
As A does not know the correct value of B j and ID U j , he/she cannot modify N j correctly. Hence, the proposed scheme is able to resist user impersonation attack.
7) SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
An adversary A can masquerade as a server and try to respond with valid message to the user U j . As already mentioned above, A cannot successfully replay and/or modify the authorization messages Msg 2 and Msg 3 due to usage of one-way hash function H (·) and secret parameters. So, the proposed scheme also resists server impersonation attack.
8) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DoS) ATTACK
In our scheme, during the login phase, U j sends the message Msg 1 to the MAS that includes the registration timestamp of U j . At the time of authorization, the MAS checks the authenticity of this message, and sends an encrypted key and an encrypted puzzle message to U j . This message includes the user current timestamp T U j and random nonce RN s . U j checks the authenticity of this message, obtains the key and decrypts the puzzle message. U j then sends a data request M j to the MAS including the server timestamps RN s and user random nonce RN j . Finally, after successful authentication and verification, the MAS replies this data request encrypted with the session key and MAS sends an acknowledgment to U j . If an attacker blocks the messages from reaching the MAS and U j , both of them will know about malicious dropping of such control messages. Furthermore, any wrong input in ID U j , PW j and B j does not allow the authentication verification successfully by the smart card SC j locally. Thus, the proposed scheme has the ability to resist the DoS attack.
9) KNOWN SESSION KEY SECRECY
The proposed scheme is protected against a compromised session key due to the following reason. Suppose the session key
is compromised by an adversary A. The session key is a hashed output of the parameters that includes the ephemeral secrets A j and K s as well as the temporal values RN j , RN s , T U j and T s . Due to the use of timestamps and random nonces, A j and K s , the session key SK U j ,S is unique for each session. Hence, compromise of a particular session key does not affect other session keys, and as a result, the proposed scheme provides the known session key secrecy property.
10) PARALLEL SESSION AND REFLECTION ATTACKS
As already discussed above, from any of the eavesdropped messages Msg 1 , Msg 2 and Msg 3 , an attacker A can neither obtain the correct password PW j nor the biometrics key α j of a legal user U j . Hence, from any eavesdropped messages, A can not create a valid login request message, and thus, he/she can not start a new session with the MAS by masquerading as a legal user. Thus, our scheme protects the parallel session and reflection attacks.
VI. FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the following functional requirements are fulfilled by the proposed scheme.
A. FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL
Only authentication is not sufficient to provide access permission to the user U j in TMIS. The proposed scheme is designed in such a way that after successful authentication, U j can access only those information for which he/she has VOLUME 5, 2017 access permission. We have used the Key-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (KP-ABE) [22] in order to achieve the finegrained access control with full granularity for accessing right data by a right user. In the proposed scheme, the secret session key SK S,U j (= SK U j ,S ) is generated between an authentic user U j and the MAS to encrypt future messages for a particular session. The current session key can be formed by U j if the user's access structure P j ''accepts" I i . This means that all the attributes specified for the information type IT i need to match with the user access structure and then only that U j will get e(g, g)
αqr (0) = e (g, g) αy to finally obtain Y α . Using the value of Y α , the user U j further computes K s .
B. USER ANONYMITY
During the login phase, U j sends the message GID j ) ) to the MAS. Suppose an attacker A eavesdrops this login request message. As this message does not contain the user id ID U j , A can not obtain the user id by eavesdropping this message. Moreover, the original identity of U j is not delivered to the MAS. Instead, the MAS receives the unique anonymous parameter N j from U j . So, even if a server spoofing attack is executed, the original identity of U j is not revealed to A. This shows that the proposed scheme preserves the user anonymity property.
C. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In authorization phase of our scheme, both U j and the MAS verify the authenticity of one another through mutual authentication. The MAS sends message
⊕H (H (n j || GID j ) ||RN s ) holds or not. An unsuccessful verification leads to termination of the phase immediately. Further, using the access tree, U j obtains the key K s . Using K s , U j decrypts the encrypted puzzle message E K s (PM ). After getting PM , U j checks the authenticity of the message by matching computed H (RN s ||PM ||E ||T i ||T U j ) with the received hash value. If this verification fails, U j stops the phase terminates immediately. In addition, U j sends the message H (PM ||RN s ||M j ), M j , E K s (PM ), RN j to the MAS, who decrypts the encrypted puzzle E K s (PM ) and gets the puzzle PM . Also, the MAS verifies computed PM = H (PM || RN j || T i ) with its own PM , T i and the received RN j . If this verification fails, the MAS terminates the phase immediately. Due to this mutual verification from both U j and the MAS, they can correctly verify the authenticity of one another.
D. SECURE SESSION KEY ESTABLISHMENT
In the authorization phase, both U j and MAS individually establish the same session key SK U j ,S and SK S,U j for future communication. Here,
. Before establishing this session key, both U j and MAS mutually authenticate each other. This guarantees that the communicated parameters and messages are resistant to replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and impersonation attacks. Hence, the established session key is secure against different attacks. 
E. EFFICIENT PASSWORD CHANGE
In the password change phase of our proposed scheme, a legal user U j alone can change his/her password without involvement of the MAS. This phase is designed in a way such that if U j enters wrong old password, the phase terminates immediately. U j can not set the new password if he/she enters a wrong old password by mistake or unknowingly. Doing so, it resists a possible denial-of-service from the system. Furthermore, the smart card SC j of U j never stores the modified password directly. It is then free from stolen smart card attack and password guessing attack too. 
VII. SECURITY, FUNCTIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we perform the security, functionality and performance comparisons among some related authentication schemes proposed in TMIS. The results show that in-spite of providing unique access privilege through the attribute based access control and group based access control, the proposed scheme can resist several well-known attacks.
A. SECURITY COMPARISON
We compare security of the proposed scheme with existing related authentication schemes for TMIS [12] , [13] , [50] . A detailed comparison on different security attacks are tabulated in Table 4 . It is clear from this table that our proposed scheme overcomes most of the security weaknesses of the existing related schemes.
B. FUNCTIONALITY COMPARISON
In Table 5 , we compare different functionalities of our proposed scheme with existing related authentication schemes for TMIS. For comparison, we have considered the same schemes as mentioned in the previous section. A study of the tabulated result shows that none of the existing schemes provide fine-grained access control and group based user access control in TMIS.
C. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the comparisons of comuputational costs, communication costs, security features and functionality features aming the proposed scheme and other related schemes, such as the schemes of Jiang et al. [12] , Mishra et al. [13] and Awasthi and Srivastava [50] . Table 6 shows the execution times for various cryptographic operations which are required for analysis of computational cost measurement for our proposed scheme and other schemes. The results shown in Table 6 are based on an existing experiment conducted on an Intel Pentium IV 2600 MHz processor with 1024 MB RAM [51] . We ignore the computation cost of bitwise XOR operation as it is significantly low as compared to other operations. We further assume that T hc ≈ T Ch . In addition, T fe ≈ T m = 0.06308 seconds [52] .
In Table 7 , we analyze the efficiency on computation costs of the proposed scheme and the existing schemes for TMIS [12] , [13] , [50] . For all these given schemes, we separately tabulate the user side and server side computational costs for all the login and authorization phases of the proposed scheme. The computational costs of the proposed scheme, Awasthi-Srivastava's scheme, Jiang et al. ' Tables 4 and 5 .
In Table 8 , we tabulate the number of bits required for each message communication in the proposed fine-grained access control scheme. We assume that bit size of the identity, timestamps and random numbers are 160 bits, 32 bits and 128 bits, respectively. The hash output is 160 bits (if we take H (·) as SHA-1 [43] ), the block size of symmetric encryption/decryption (for example, if we apply AES-128 [4] ) is 128 bits, and the prime number is 160 bits. Since registration phase is executed only once, we concentrate on the login and authentication/authorization phases for calculation of communication and computation costs.
The 384, 800 + |E j | and 576 bits, respectively, where |E j | denotes the number of bits present in E j .
We compare the total amount of bits needed for message exchanges among the proposed scheme and other related existing schemes. From Table 9 , it is noted that our scheme requires a sum total of 1760 + |E j | bits, whereas the schemes of Awasthi and Srivastava, Jiang et al. and Mishra et al. require 544, 896 and 704 bits, respectively. Though the proposed scheme requires more communication cost as compared to other schemes, it provides various security and functionality features as shown in Tables 4 and 5 .
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new fine grained access control scheme with user authentication for TMIS. The proposed scheme uses both the user password and biometric to provide better security as compared to password based authentication schemes. The proposed scheme provides group-based user authentication depending on the access rights provided for the genuine users in TMIS. The proposed scheme is tested for its security using the formal security under the widely-accepted RealOr-Random model and also mutual authentication using the broadly-used BAN logic. In addition, the informal security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is also resistant to various known attacks. The proposed scheme also provides better security and functinality features as compared to other existing schemes for TMIS. Furthermore, the communication and compuational costs of the proposed scheme are comparable with those for other existing schemes for TMIS.
Future work includes implementing and evaluating the proposed scheme in a real-world environment. This would allow us to fine-tune the scheme, if necessary, to offer better security and performance in a real-world deployment. 
